205Aligning the disclosure of exposures subject to the IRB Transitional Approach for equity exposures (Rules 4.4 to 4.10 of the Credit Risk: General Provisions (CRR) Part) in templates CMS1 and CMS2 with the approach to reporting these exposures;
207Updating fields in templates pertaining to the output floor calculation (OF 02.00, OF 02.01, UKB CMS 1, PRA 112 and PRA 113), and associated instructions, to align with changes to Article 92(3A) outlined in paragraph 2.5 of this PS;
209Updating instructions for OF 16.03 to clarify what must be reported within each bucket amount in the Business Indicator Component template for the purposes of calculating Operational Risk RWAs;
211Updating instructions and templates for OF 16.04 and UKB OR2, to clarify what must be reported in the Business Indicator and subcomponents template for PRA-approved excluded divested activities; and
213Deleting Article 430a of the Reporting (CRR) Part (the requirement to report losses stemming from exposures secured by immovable property) and template C 15.00, as these will become redundant following the revocation of CRR Article 124(2). This deletion is unrelated to the wider work on deletions the PRA consulted on per its consultation paper CP21/25.
2172.16 As set out in PS20/25 – The Strong and Simple Framework: The simplified capital regime for Small Domestic Deposit Takers (SDDTs) – near-final and PS4/26 – The Strong and Simple Framework: The simplified capital regime for Small Domestic Deposit Takers (SDDTs) – final, given the implementation dates for the Basel 3.1 standards and SDDT capital regime are aligned, the Interim Capital Regimefootnote [9] (ICR) is no longer required and existing ICR-related rules will be revoked and SoP2/23 deleted in its entirety. Therefore, the PRA has not made the ICR-related rules that were in the near-final rule instruments appended to PS17/23 and PS9/24.
2213.1 This chapter provides the PRA’s feedback to responses to CP17/25 – Basel 3.1: Adjustments to the market risk framework, and sets out the PRA’s final policy on market risk.
2233.2 The PRA set out the near-final rules and policy material to implement the Basel 3.1 market risk framework, known as the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), through two publications: PS17/23 and PS9/24. Given continued uncertainty over the timing of the implementation of the FRTB in some other jurisdictions, the PRA consulted in CP17/25 on four proposed adjustments to the near-final market risk rules published in PS9/24, and the related supervisory statement published in PS17/23, namely:
225Proposal 1: delay the FRTB internal model approach (FRTB-IMA) by one year to 1 January 2028. Firms would be able to continue to use existing market risk models in the interim period;
227Proposal 2: implement operational simplifications to the treatment of collective investment undertakings (CIUs) in the trading book boundary and the Advanced Standardised Approach (ASA);
2333.3 The PRA received seven responses to CP17/25. The respondents were supportive of the overall proposed approach. A number requested the PRA consider further measures to reduce the capital and operational impact. The PRA has considered all the responses, and its feedback is set out in the following sections. The structure is consistent with the proposals above. A number of respondents also requested clarifications on the published near-final rules and raised issues outside the scope of the proposals in CP17/25. Feedback to those broader responses is set out in the final section of this chapter.
2373.4 The PRA proposed to delay implementation of the FRTB-IMA by one year to Saturday 1 January 2028. In the interim period from Friday 1 January 2027, firms would retain existing IMA model permissions. Positions not in scope of existing IMA permissions would move to the new standardised approaches, either the ASA or simplified standardised approach (SSA), under the requirements set out in PS17/23 and PS9/24. For firms with existing IMA permissions, this would result in positions not in scope of those permissions moving to the ASA.
2393.5 The PRA received seven responses to this proposal. All respondents supported the proposed delay to FRTB-IMA implementation. Respondents recognised the importance of international coordination on the market risk framework, including the benefit of aiming to broadly align implementation timelines for that part of the FRTB across major jurisdictions.
2413.6 While supportive of the delay, six respondents highlighted a number of potential challenges in implementing the proposal. These included increased operational complexity due to the FRTB approaches having been built on different systems to those for the current market risk framework – both systems would need to be maintained for the interim period in order to run the existing IMA and the ASA. Three respondents noted the potential for double-counting of risks for positions partially modelled under existing IMA permissions. Finally, although not directly related to the proposal, a number of respondents highlighted challenges of identifying which positions need to move from the trading book to the banking book (and vice versa) under the new trading book boundary.
2433.7 The respondents raising these challenges argued that the PRA should provide firms an option to retain positions not in scope of existing IMA permissions on the existing Standardised Approach – ie an option to fully delay implementation of the FRTB during the interim period. Respondents also recommended that the PRA delay the implementation of the new trading book boundary for firms alongside the FRTB-IMA delay.
2453.8 The PRA acknowledges the proposal would result in some operational challenges for those firms that take the option to retain their IMA model for the interim year. However, those challenges should be considered alongside the benefit of the additional flexibility the proposal provides for firms – at their own discretion – above that provided in PS17/23 and PS9/24. The PRA notes the available evidence suggests that the operational challenges do not impact all positions and all firms. At the same time, the PRA can confirm that firms will retain the option to implement the ASA for their entire trading book from Friday 1 January 2027.
2473.9 Having considered respondents’ arguments to delay the ASA for firms with existing IMA permissions, the PRA is of the view that this would distort competition. Firms without IMA permissions would be subject to the newest risk metrics and risk calibration, while the firms with IMA permissions – typically those with the largest market risks - could continue to remain on outdated calibrations and risk metrics. The PRA also notes that all firms have to calculate the ASA for the purpose of the output floor, so firms with existing IMA permissions would have to calculate it in any case. Similarly, delaying the boundary requirements for IMA firms only would mean different firms would allocate and capitalise the same position differently. The PRA considers this would not facilitate the secondary competition objective.
2493.10 Having considered the responses; the PRA has decided to implement the proposed FRTB-IMA delay as set out in CP17/25. However, to address firms’ concerns on the challenges to implement the proposal, the PRA is clarifying that during the interim period:
251firms can continue to include trading book positions in their internal models in accordance with their existing IMA permission, where those trading book positions would otherwise be ineligible under FRTB-IMA (for example securitisation positions);
253for specific risks relating to securitisation and credit derivative positions and correlation trading portfolio as set out in Article 364(2) and (3) of Part A of Annex 3 of the Internal Model Approach (IMA) Part, firms can continue to capitalise these risks through the existing standardised approach where the firms do not have IMA permission for these specific risks;
255firms can continue to capitalise their interest rate internal hedge positions in the same portfolio with other trading book positions under their existing IMA permission, where those interest rate internal hedge positions would otherwise need to be capitalised separately under FRTB-IMA; and
257where firms’ existing IMA permission leads to double-counting of risk as a result of the FRTB-IMA delay, firms should raise this with their respective supervisors.
2593.11 One respondent separately asked the PRA to clarify the process to revoke or amend existing IMA permissions during the interim period. The PRA can clarify that the existing process for revoking IMA permissions will apply, in accordance with Part 8 of the Capital Requirements Regulations 2013. Where firms intend to move completely to the ASA, this application and assessment will be proportionate to the risks. Where firms want to revoke part of their IMA permission, this would constitute a change to the permission. Firms must comply with the requirements for making changes to the permission in accordance with Article 363(3) of Part A of Annex 3 of the Market Risk: Internal Model Approach (CRR) Part. The PRA can also clarify that existing IMA permissions would cease to apply automatically at the end of the interim period.
2633.12 The PRA proposed to implement two de minimis thresholds to make the market risk treatment more proportionate and reduce the frequency of cliff-edges in the framework, such that:
265firms must allocate CIU positions to the trading book where at least 90 per cent of the CIU’s underlying holdings (by value) would be allocated to the trading book. The residual position would be capitalised with a 70% risk weight under the ASA fall-back approach (FBA); and
267firms may use the market risk look-through approach (LTA) where at least 90 per cent of the CIU’s holdings (by value) can be looked through. The residual position would be capitalised with a 70% risk weight under the ASA FBA.
2693.13 The PRA received five responses to this proposal. Respondents generally supported a de minimis threshold for trading book eligibility, noting that it would reduce cliff-edge effects and operational burden.
2713.14 Four respondents argued that the proposed 90% threshold for LTA eligibility should be lower. They noted that it would still be challenging to obtain such a high level of transparency of CIUs holdings on a consistent basis, particularly for large or frequently traded CIUs. Instead, they suggested that the PRA either remove or lower the threshold to 50%. They noted that the residual positions would be conservatively capitalised under the ASA FBA and were of the opinion that such an approach would therefore not undermine the primary objective.
2733.15 Having considered the responses, the PRA has decided to implement the de minimis threshold for trading book eligibility as consulted. However, for the LTA eligibility de minimis threshold, the PRA acknowledges the feedback that there could remain costs from some operational challenges for obtaining the required high level of transparency on CIUs on a consistent basis if a 90% threshold were applied. While the PRA notes that removing the threshold entirely would not directly lead to imprudent capital requirements, the PRA considers that firms should, as a matter of good risk management, have sufficient information on the products they invest in, and the risks they are exposed to. Therefore, prescribing a threshold is necessary to reflect that firms should only use the most advanced risk measures where they have a sufficient level of information on their underlying CIUs exposures, but that needs to be balanced against the costs of collecting the information. The PRA therefore has decided to retain a threshold for LTA eligibility but lower it to 50%.
2753.16 The PRA considers this change advances the PRA’s primary objective and facilitates its secondary competition objective, by ensuring firms are managing the risk appropriately while reducing operational complexity.
281the treatment of ‘premium listings’ CIUs under FRTB, in light of the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) decision to remove the term ‘premium listings’ and introduce the term ‘closed-ended investment funds’; and
283the treatment of real estate investment trusts (REITs) and real estate investment funds (REIFs) for trading book eligibility, where these instruments also qualify as CIUs.
287SS13/13 to clarify how firms should estimate the ‘value’ of CIUs for the purposes of applying the relevant de minimis thresholds referred to this in this section;
289Article 325az(9) of the Market Risk: Internal Model Approach (CRR) Part and Article 325j of the Market Risk: Advanced Standardised Approach (CRR) Part respectively, to clarify that ‘closed-ended investment funds’ as defined in the FCA Handbook can be treated as listed equity; and
291Article 104(2)(h) of the Trading Book (CRR) Part, to clarify that shares or units in REITs and REIFs that also qualify as CIUs are not outside of the trading book solely under this provision.
2953.19 In CP17/25, the PRA acknowledged that there may be a small number of instruments or business lines where the residual risk add-on (RRAO) capital requirement could be disproportionate to the risk. The PRA therefore proposed to introduce a permissions regime for the RRAO. Under the regime, where firms can demonstrate that the RRAO capital requirement is disproportionate, they may apply to the PRA to capitalise such risks using an alternative methodology. The PRA expects that the permission regime would only be applicable to a small number of instruments where the capital impact is likely to be material to firms.
2973.20 The PRA received five responses to this proposal. All respondents welcomed the more proportionate treatment for instruments under RRAO. But some raised concerns that a permission regime could introduce disproportionate operational burden to firms, particularly for relatively simple, well-understood instruments that can be hedged and where they consider the risks are not material. They also noted that a permission regime could lead to inconsistent treatment of the same risk across firms, and across jurisdictions in cases where they apply exemptions. Instead, respondents argued that the PRA should exempt a pre-defined list of instruments from the RRAO framework.