Source: https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/multi-firm-reviews/fca-update-cash-savings-september-2024 · captured 2026-09-27 · checked 2026-09-28 · 04fddb5b

501We did not see evidence that many firms had fully assessed the outcomes for customers with characteristics of vulnerability.
502
503The better FVAs we reviewed proactively considered what characteristics of vulnerability easy access savings customers may have (for example, customers with limited digital capability, poor financial resilience or in poor health) and whether these customers were receiving fair value.
504
505Less developed FVAs inappropriately relied on customers to self-identify and declare vulnerability rather than firms proactively considering it themselves. Many FVAs were unable to identify and monitor outcomes for customers in vulnerable circumstances due to gaps and limitations in management information. We expect all firms who are unable to effectively monitor outcomes for vulnerable customers to have clear plans in place to address this shortfall, in line with the requirements of the Duty (PRIN 2A.4.8R(4))
506
507Contextual factors (including cost to serve)
508
509Firms’ assessments of value may include contextual factors about a firm’s business model, where relevant. This is particularly the case with savings accounts, where firms must balance business models that offer lending and savings. Where a firm is relying on these factors to justify its fair value conclusions, this reasoning should be clearly articulated within FVAs to enable it to be challenged as part of firms’ governance.
510
511Contextual factors may include:
512
513Costs to manufacture or distribute the product.
514
515Characteristics of a firm’s business model, including – for example – the extent of cross-subsidies between different products.
516
517Incorporating factors such as the above with supporting evidence in an FVA can provide necessary context to understand pricing decisions.
518
519There is no requirement that firms must include costs in assessments of value, but understanding the margins that a product earns can be useful context for firms’ governance to assess fair value. If a firm seeks to justify a lower interest rate than peers, or other products it offers, principally based on the costs it incurs to provide that product, we expect to see a clear rationale within the FVA.
520
521For firms that provide a range of products and services, understanding the cost of supplying each product or service can be complex. However, some firms chose to include a cost analysis in their FVAs. In those FVAs that included an assessment of costs, we found the better FVAs demonstrated a clear analysis of the relationship between the interest rate offered to customers and the relevant costs to the firm of providing the product. Other FVAs used the firm’s cost to serve without explaining its basis or providing any challenge as to how different customers might be affected. We consider these FVAs lacked sufficient assessment.
522
523The degree of cost analysis within FVAs is for firms to consider, but where it is used the analysis must be sufficiently clear to enable the assessment of fair value to be undertaken.
524
525Taking appropriate action
526
527The Consumer Duty requires firms to take appropriate action if they identify that customers are not receiving fair value (PRIN 2A.4.25R) or that any group of customers are receiving worse outcomes than another for the same product (PRIN 2A.9.12R).
528
529In these circumstances, the best FVAs we reviewed set out the steps the firm was taking to mitigate harm, which included increasing interest rates and improving customer communications. Other less developed FVAs acknowledged poor outcomes but did not set out appropriate actions.
530
531These FVAs often set out the firm’s intention to write to customers to simply inform them that they were receiving a low rate, rather than to address the harm more proactively and substantively. Firms must ensure their communications equip retail customers to make decisions that are effective, timely and properly informed (PRIN 2A.5.3R) and (where appropriate) regularly monitor the impact of the communications (PRIN 2A.5.10R).
532
533The Consumer Duty sets out that firms must not rely on customers to consider whether the product provides fair value in place of the firm’s own assessment (PRIN 2A.4.20R). Simply alerting customers that they are on low rates may contribute towards meeting the consumer understanding outcome, but it would not satisfy the Duty’s requirements not to offer poor value products in the first instance. Please see our Customer Communications update below.
534
535Data, governance, and outcomes monitoring
536
537Firms’ assessments of value should be supported by evidence and not simply seek to justify previous pricing decisions. Any fair value conclusions should be supported by evidence and reasoning throughout the FVA. Firms should ensure that the focus on achieving good customer outcomes is understood at all relevant levels of the business.
538
539Firms’ FVAs should contain appropriate data and metrics to identify and track outcomes for different groups of customers. We appreciate that firms may still be refining their approach to their FVAs and developing required data capabilities. In these instances, firms should consider and identify proposals to develop their capabilities with clear timelines as well as actions on how they will identify and mitigate foreseeable harm in the meantime.
540
541Some firms have developed data and monitoring strategies to better understand customer outcomes. Where FVAs identified areas of concern, such as differential outcomes leading to foreseeable harm for groups of customers, we have seen some firms follow this with detailed actions to reduce harm.
542
543Less positively, we have seen some firms fail to identify products that are not performing as designed and producing poor outcomes for many customers. For example, we noted accounts which required customers to renew an annual bonus to retain a higher level of interest, but most customers failed to do so, and this was not identified as a concern within the FVA.
544
5453. Cash savings practices where we have observed greater risk of not meeting Consumer Duty standards
546
547Our work has identified a number of practices which may be acceptable but tend to pose greater risk of not delivering good customer outcomes.
548
549These include:
550
551Creating multiple tranches of a savings product which offer the same terms and conditions – distinguished only by the use of distinct issue numbers – to pay higher interest rates to new customers and not to existing customers of the same product
552
553This practice may be helpful to allow firms to balance funding needs with savings demand. It can also help prompt customers to switch to the new issue. However, adopting this pricing approach puts firms at greater risk of not meeting the Duty’s obligations to customers in older issues of the product.
554
555This is especially the case where the pricing structure which leaves these customers with lower rates is combined with a lack of effective customer communication to enable them to move to higher rates, should they wish to do so. We want firms to consider how those customers in the older tranches are being effectively communicated with and receiving fair value.
556
557Using annually renewable bonus rates on savings products
558
559We do not have any issues in principle with firms paying customers bonuses. It can be a good way to encourage customers to switch to products and an effective component of competition.
560
561However, in some cases this pricing structure is at risk of not aligning with the standards required by the Duty. This is the case where customers are required to register for a bonus to receive a better deal but the rate without the bonus is an outlier and/or there is a lack of effective customer communications to encourage customers to do that.
562
563If in scrutinising their data firms sees that customers tend to have very low uptake of the optional bonus, receiving a lower rate as a consequence, firms should consider whether those customers who are not renewing are receiving fair value and how they are being effectively communicated with.
564
565Using regressive interest rate tiering to discourage customers from maintaining large balances in easy access savings accounts
566
567We recognise offering higher, more competitive rates at lower balances can be an effective way of attracting savers to start saving funds.
568
569Whilst regressive interest rates can also incentivize customers with larger balances that want to hold those savings for longer periods of time to look at alternative, more suitable cash savings accounts or other types of investments, there may be other ways of achieving this.
570
571In particular, where firms adopt this regressive interest rate pricing structure, they can be at greater risk of not meeting the Duty’s requirements relating to fair value, ensuring the product meets the needs, characteristics and objectives of the target market and communications to retail customers. Accounts with these features need careful monitoring to assess whether the majority of balances receive lower rates, how that lower rate compares with other accounts and that customers with larger balances have adequately considered the alternatives.
572
573We consider the above practices can be important for competition within the cash savings market, but firms must be mindful of the potential adverse consequences on some groups of customers. Therefore, firms should consider whether, in operation, these practices satisfy the holistic requirements of the Duty.
574
575Firms using these - or similar - practices should review whether the relevant products are meeting the needs of customers, whether they offer fair value to different customers groups and whether communications to customers who are not experiencing good outcomes are effective.
576
5774. Data update (actions 2-5)
578
579Improved savings rates
580
581The tables below show the improvement in the average interest rate paid on easy access and fixed-term and notice deposits between the publication of our July 2023 report and end June 2024.
582
583Table 1: Average easy access deposit interest rates and base rate at quarter end
584
58531 July 2023
586
587Q3 2023
588
589Q4 2023
590
591Q1 2024
592
593Q2 2024
594
595Average rate
596
5971.66%
598
5991.96%
600